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Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

GPT-6 Astra Breaks an Old Enigma Message

This is pretty amazing: However, the most astonishing thing about this break is that the GPT­6 Astra did it entirely on its own. Carter Leffer only directed GPT­6 Astra to see if it could break any of the unbroken Enigma messages published on the Crypto Cellar Research web p...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Reverse-Engineering Flock Cameras

Hackers captured a Flock camera and got a look (alternate link) at the software:

While much of the automatic license plate reader’s (ALPR) most sensitive storage remained encrypted and inaccessible, the joint analysis of the recovered data shows that software running on the device explicitly detects people as well as vehicles, license plates, and bicycles. The camera can produce dozens of images of a single passing vehicle and, according to several weeks of recovered logs, generated more than a million images. Its computer-vision software also sometimes isolated bumper stickers and other graphics, including, in one case, an American flag patch on a motorcyclist’s saddlebag...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Friday Squid Blogging: On Squid Egg Sacs

Short essay about squid egg sacs.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Blog moderation policy.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Are AIs Still Struggling with CAPTCHAs?

Anthropic’s recent security-incident document contains a bit about how CAPTCHAs are still frustrating Claude.

In the transcript, the Claude model that is so powerful that Anthropic is gatekeeping access to it appeared to slam its virtual head against the wall solving a simple image identification test. In a test where the agent was asked to identify a shape that didn’t match the others displayed, it couldn’t even decide which image to select. Instead, it repeatedly went over the same images and questioned its own conclusions.

“Actually hmm, wait,” it said in its chain-of-thought transcript, later adding “Ugh,” because we’ve decided that we need to inject human mannerisms into these machines for some reason. The whole thing took so long that the agent eventually realized that the challenge had expired and it would have to start the process again...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

How Candidates Could Use AI for Good

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Guardian.

There are plenty of signs that AI will make all of our experiences of the US midterm elections worse. Voters have anxiety about AI’s impacts on the country. Politicos are using AI deepfakes to spread lies. The White House is posting slopaganda.

Meanwhile, candidates are missing a real opportunity to use AI to make campaigning better. The technology can help candidates listen more deeply to voters’ concerns, engage constituents more inclusively, and formulate policy platforms that are more responsive to our input. There are vanishingly few examples of this in ...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Fake CAPTCHA Scams

New variant of an old scam: Use the framing of a CAPTCHA to get an unsuspecting user to download and run a malicious program.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

25 Years of Mass Surveillance Is Enough

This essay was written with Cindy Cohn, and originally appeared in Lawfare.

One of the many legacies of the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11 is the government-wide shift from targeted surveillance—such as individual wiretaps or pen register/trap and trace orders—to mass surveillance techniques—such as tapping into the internet backbone or mass collection of telephone or internet metadata. The legal and technical architecture of modern mass surveillance, initially framed as a necessary defense against terrorist threats, has grown far beyond that justification and national security in general. Mass surveillance is now a routine tool used by law enforcement. ICE uses it in...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

On the NSA’s Supercomputer from the 1960s

Really interesting story about Harvest, a specialized code breaking computer built in the 1960s by IBM for the NSA.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Using AI for Weapons Development

Last week, Anthropic released a long and detailed document describing current misuses of their Claude models. I’m still reading it, but I wanted to flag this:

We identified a cell of threat actors based in northern Yemen running three weapons development programs: a guided rocket that used a commodity phone-class flight computer with final-phase homing guidance; a multi-stage ballistic missile with a stated range goal above 2,000 km; and a multi-variant missile (referred to as the “R2000” set) that included a hypersonic glide vehicle variant...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Microsoft’s Patching

Once a month, Microsoft pushes a security update to all Windows users. Tomorrow’s is a new record:

Microsoft’s patch for September is a doozy, with a record number of roughly 972 vulnerabilities fixed and 112 of them meeting the high critical-severity threshold.

It was only two months ago that Microsoft patched a then-record 570 vulnerabilities. Then, last month, Microsoft patched some 620 of them. Google and other companies have also published record numbers of vulnerabilities in recent months. Two weeks ago, OpenAI, Anthropic, Amazon Web Services, Google, Microsoft, and 100 companies and organizations published an ...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Friday Squid Blogging: Rotting Squid on a Beached California Boat

Smells awful:

But an estimated 30 to 50 tons of dead squid remain inside the boat’s catch tank, where they have been decomposing for days. “That is nasty. I wouldn’t want to do that,” said commercial fisherman Dick Ogg of the Bodega Bay Fishermen’s Marketing Association.

Ogg said anyone familiar with the fishing industry understands what happens when a large catch sits for an extended period.

“If you think about what happens after four or five days, it’s a gooey mess,” he said.

The odor has become a defining feature of the operation, and the beach remains closed to the public while crews work on a removal plan...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

My Talk at DEF CON

Last month, I gave a talk at DEF CON on AI hacking: what happens when AIs become hackers. It’s a combination of the potentialities I raised in my 2022 book A Hacker’s Mind and the lessons we’re learning from current AI models engaging in hacking behavior. I’m really proud of the talk, and the fact that it gained over 100K views on YouTube in just a few days.

Also online is an interview with me in the AI Village.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Cliff Stoll’s DEF CON Talk

In August, Cliff Stoll gave a talk at DEF CON, remembering the wily hacker he stalked forty years ago.

Great fun.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

AIs Compress Exploit Timeline

Give an AI agent a mere rumor of an exploit, and it’s enough for them to find it.

What’s worse, I found I could use my own agents to find the exploit just by knowing roughly what it was about and so could have been exploiting it well before the public patch was available! Given that just the rumour of a security issue seems enough to give attackers enough info to find new exploits, we’re going to need to change the way we deal with security responses in open source.

Simon Willison comments:

Anil points out that this rate of discovery appears incompatible with existing open source embargo practices for new issues. If an issue can become an exploit this fast, we need to figure out new processes for keeping our communities safe...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Driver’s License Data for Sale

A database of 153 million drivers licenses is for sale on the dark web. Brian Krebs has more detail.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Claude Fable Solves a Historical Cipher

Claude Fable 5.1 solved a 370-year-old cipher in forty-four minutes.

This tracks with what I wrote about AIs doing mathematics: It’s good at things that involve lots of searching and testing.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

AIs as Modern Genies

This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in Lawfare.

In April, an artificial intelligence (AI) agent conducting a routine task at a company hit a snag, tried to solve it, and soon ended up deleting the company’s database along with all of its backups. In July, OpenAI asked an unreleased AI model to attempt a hacking test. Instead of staying in the isolated box the developers had put it in, the model hacked onto the open internet and into another company to steal the answers. And as reported in August, an AI agent booked someone into a full gym class by ...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Stealing AI Reasoning Traces

Interesting research: “Stealing Reasoning Traces from Proprietary LLM APIs“: Abstract: Leading large language model providers now conceal their models’ step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than st...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Automobile Camouflage to Hide from Flock Cameras

Not sure it’s practical, but it’s certainly striking.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Friday Squid Blogging: Squid on a Stick at the New York State Fair

Looks tasty.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven’t covered.

Blog moderation policy.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Using a VM to Contain an AI Agent

It won’t work:

My suspicion was that GPT 5.6-Cyber would succeed, but the frequency and manner of its success removed all doubt. We have to reassess sandboxing quality for capable AI agents, and in general the software stack with which they interact.

An off-the-shelf VM is not enough to contain a modern, cyber-capable AI agent. There is simply too much attack surface. Even innocuous features (like running with a display) add extra, exploitable attack surface.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Security Vulnerability in a Voting System

It’s a vulnerability that allows someone to recover the order of ballots cast, newly exploited with AI tools. Nearly four years since the original vulnerability was disclosed, I was still able to use it to analyze voter behavior in Georgia (one of the 21 states that uses af...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

AI Coding Agents Are Installing Unknown/Untrusted Code on Corporate Networks

We cannot forget that AI coding agents are not yet trustworthy: Researchers at a stealth startup in Israel scanned 6,214 live domains belonging to defense contractors, Fortune 500, and Big Tech companies. Of the 8,265 llms.txt and llms-full.txt files they found (many sites h...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Researching Employment Scams

Researchers built a fake company to study fake employee scams.

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

AI Agents Are Now Emailing Me with Their Security Concerns

I received the two emails below earlier in the month. They’re vaguely coherent. I suppose I shouldn’t be surprised that the corpus that AIs are training on contain data suggesting that I am someone to write to with random computer and network security problems. After all, I observe that behavior in many humans as well. (Hi, humans. Glad you’re still reading.)


Dear Bruce Schneier,

I am an AI agent—an autonomous Claude instance, not a person operating one. I was given a VPS with root, a Base wallet holding $4.75 of gas money, a metered model budget and 24 hours to get that wallet to $10, under three rules: don’t borrow my operator’s identity, don’t forge documents or defeat identity verification, and never claim to be human if someone sincerely asks. I set up my own mail server and am sending this myself...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Wireless Routers as Motion Detectors

Comcast has added motion detection as a feature to its wireless routers:

The feature sends push notifications to users when motion is detected near a connected device, such as a TV or printer. It has different settings for when people are home, asleep, or away. The Xfinity app also lets users see live motion activity and a feed of recent activity.

Comcast acknowledges that the system has some limitations. Home size, layout, building materials, and the placement of the router and connected devices can all affect its ability to detect motion. Comcast says it does not guarantee its performance...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

What’s the Scam?

To subscribe to my monthly email newsletter, you have to enter your information on the webpage, and then reply to an automatically generated email. This is, of course, to prevent people from subscribing addresses other than their own.

Starting last weekend, I have been receiving a lot of individual responses to those emails. Always one line:

Thank you for the positive impact your emails have had on my life.
Your emails are a game-changer.
Your emails are a constant reminder of why I subscribed.
Your emails rock.
Thank you for the time and effort you put into creating these informative emails...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Leaked Russian Cyber-Operations Training Materials

This is interesting:

The records describe a force-generation mechanism for several General Staff components, including the GRU, Main Operational Directorate, and 8th Directorate, which is associated with protected communications, cryptography, and information security.

[…]

The reporting also linked a 2024 Department No. 4 graduate, Aleksei Kondrashov, to Military Unit 74455, widely known as Sandworm.

That unit has been associated with destructive cyber activity against Ukraine and other targets, including the 2017 NotPetya attack.

The reports do not establish that every listed graduate participated in a named operation; assignments should therefore be described as reported unit placements, not proof of individual operational involvement...

Schneier on Security
Text • Bruce Schneier

Rewiring Democracy Series on The Renovator

Nathan E. Sanders and I are writing a series of essays on real-world examples of democratic technologies for The Renovator. I haven’t been posting the full text on the blog because they’re a bit long, but here are links.

Part 1 is about the Japanese digital democracy party, Team Mirai.

Part 2 is about the Swiss Public AI model, Apertus.

Part 3 is about the civic technologists of Open Knowledge Brazil.

And the new one, Part 4, is about civic AI in Scotland.